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 Redrawing the Body Politic: Federalism, Regionalism and the Creation of New 
States in India. 
In 2000 the federal map of India was redrawn to create three new States, signifying a 
significant shift in the attitude of many of India’s major political parties towards territorial 
reorganisation. This paper suggests that a new era in the political economy of India – 
associated with economic liberalisation; the rise of the Hindu Right; the regionalisation 
of politics; and the emergence of a coalitional system of government in New Delhi – 
provides a new ‘field of opportunities’ for regions demanding State recognition. The 
paper concludes that, in this matter, the major political parties are primarily by 
expediency and opportunism rather than, as is claimed, by an evaluation of the 
democratic and developmental potential of smaller States.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The nature of India's federalism is central to any understanding of its political 
economy (Corbridge, 1995). Analyses of federalism in India have tended to focus on 
its Constitutional provisions; the changing political economy of Centre-State 
relations; and the challenges to the state's federalist claims, evinced most clearly in 
the secessionist movements in Punjab, Kashmir and the North East. This paper 
addresses a subject which has taken a rather lower profile over the years - the 
creation of new federal States within the Union of India.  
In 2000 the internal map of India was redrawn to create three new States - 
Uttaranchal, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh (see map). The formation of these States is 
interesting because historically the major political parties have tended to oppose the 
formation of new States in India.1 Unlike Nigeria, which has a history of strategically 
dividing and expanding the number of its federal units (Dent, 1995), changes to 
India's internal political-administrative boundaries over the last fifty years have 
usually been conceded only after considerable struggle. Successive central 
Governments have tended to view assertions of regional identity with suspicion, and 
to stigmatise them as parochial, chauvinist and even anti-national (Oommen, 1990a). 
The reasons for this include the traumatic legacy of the Partition in 1947; the concern 
that India might disintegrate under the weight of its divided colonial history; and its 
sheer ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural plurality. Although alterations and 
additions to India's States have been made over the past fifty years, until recently 
New Delhi has tended to sanction these border changes only reluctantly, and neither 
did such movements and demands tend to receive national-level support from 
opposition parties. Thus the political map of India today remains dominated by 
populous, geographically vast, and culturally heterogeneous 'mega-States' like Uttar 
Pradesh, which, with over 160 million people, is demographically bigger than many 
large countries (see Arora and Verney, 1992, for a comparative perspective). 
The creation of these new States marks a departure in political attitudes at the 
Centre in two main ways. First, rather than resisting the demands for new States, 
many of the major political actors at the Centre (recent Governments, their coalition 
parties and opposition parties) supported some or all of the regional movements. 
This support was often both fickle and flimsy - a change in the political equation in 
one of the areas under discussion would see a reversal of interest, foot-dragging or 
even an apparent change of heart on the issue. There were also discrepancies on 
the issue between different levels and units of particular parties.2 But the degree and 
consistency of support is in some ways irrelevant. What is important here is the fact 
that territorial change has become a ‘permissable’ issue for party agendas – debates 
over territorial reorganisation have re-entered ‘mainstream’ political discussion in the 
mid-/late 1990s. The second point of departure is that these new States were 
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 proposed on the grounds of administrative efficiency rather than on the language 
principle that has, ostensibly, guided State formation the past (Brass, 1994; King, 
1997). This too marks a shift in India's federal ideology, as regional identity, culture 
and geographical difference would now appear to be recognised as a valid basis for 
administrative division and political representation. As we shall see below, this 
distinction between past and present is fuzzier than suggested here, but there has 
undoubtedly been a qualitative shift in the attitude towards new States amongst the 
large political parties at the Centre. 
This paper does not look at individual regional mobilisations, or their outcomes in 
specific areas – although this line of inquiry does potentially offer important insights 
into a whole range of issues around governance, state and civil society.3 Rather this 
paper is concerned with exploring the relationship between the shift in attitudes in 
New Delhi to the issue of new States, and the changing political economy of India. If 
a broad ‘periodisation’ of post-Independence India’s political economy can be 
charted, then it would seem clear that a third ‘era’ is underway, following on from the 
Nehruvian years, and then the Indira/decline of Congress period (see Yadav, 1999). 
This new period is broadly marked by the post-1991 liberalisation of the economy, 
the meteoric rise of the Hindu Right, and a shift from one-party dominance of the 
Centre to the emergence of a relatively stable system of coalition government (if 
much less so a stability of the coalitions themselves). Related to this is the 
‘regionalisation of politics’, whereby smaller regional and State-specific parties have 
come to exert more power not just in the States themselves (in government, or as 
partners of ‘national’ parties), but also in the national parliament itself (Saez, 2002). 
Recent national-level debates and decisions about territorial reorganisation provide a 
way of exploring these shifts. 
The paper starts with a short history of territorial reordering in independent India, and 
outlines some of the colonial legacies and postcolonial imperatives that guided this 
process. Section III outlines the popular and political debates on the creation of new 
States, and Section IV then sets the issue within broader trends within India's 
changing political economy. Section V provides a final discussion of the argument 
being made in the paper. 
 
THE MAP OF STATES: INDEPENDENCE AND AFTER 
In the months preceding Independence and the first formative years after it, India's 
leaders faced an enormously complex task in the construction of both state and 
nation. One decision about which there was little or no alternative was the political 
form India should take. Jalal (1995) argues that federalism was less of a choice than 
a necessity given the country’s vast size and diversity and its history of repeated 
colonisation. In theory federalism allows for both unity and diversity, although in 
practice it includes a wide range of possibilities in its ideology and arrangements 
(Smith, 1995). India’s Constitution is generally recognised to significantly favour an 
economically and politically strong Union Government vis-à-vis the States (Dua, 
1979; Dandekar, 1987; Brass, 1994), a classic outcome in a postcolonial polity, and 
with particular reason for India (see below). A second closely related decision that the 
leadership faced in 1947 concerned the demarcation of the States - the size, shape 
and composition of its political-administrative units. The patchwork of political units 
left by the British was the result of: 
[A] process of annexation, and on the basis of strategic and political 
considerations rather than on any rational basis ... [T]he infra-structure of the 
polity that we inherited in 1947 was a confused mosaic created by a foreign 
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 imperial power unmindful of the valid basis for the territorial organisation of the 
sub-continent. (Khan, 1992:39). 
 
The issue of the 560-plus 'Princely States' further complicated the matter. These were 
made up of extraordinary variety of political units that enjoyed quasi-autonomous 
status under colonial authority, and comprised about 45 per cent of pre-Partition 
Indian territory. They ranged from States like Hyderabad, with an area of 80,000 
miles2 and a population of 18 million, to 'States' like Varnoli Nana in Western India 
which had an area of 1 mile2 and a population of 96 at Independence (Spate et al, 
1971). Moreover, many of the Princely States were extremely fragmented. Baroda, 
one of the bigger States, was divided between four or five large non-contiguous areas 
and about thirty smaller parts. Spate et al (1971:164) suggest that: 
[T]he boundaries of the old regime were often arbitrary, the old Princely States 
in particular for the most part having neither rhyme or reason but owing their 
fantastic assortment of sizes and shapes to historical accidents not always of 
an edifying kind. 
The Indian National Congress (INC) had supported the idea of reorganising the 
States along a more rational basis as far back as 1905, and it was decided that 
conformity with the distribution of the major languages was the most sensible way of 
achieving this (King, 1997). The linguistic redistribution of the provinces was 
confirmed as a clear political objective in 1920 at the Nagpur Conference, and again 
in 1928 in the Report of the Nehru Committee of the All Parties Conference (Khan, 
1992:43). It was believed that linguistic States would encourage greater 
administrative efficiency, political cohesion and economic development than the 
existing mosaic of multi-lingual States and Provinces. But after Independence, it 
became clear that Nehru, Patel nor Gandhi were keen on these changes (Vanhanen, 
1992), and together with the amalgamation of the Princely States, pre-existing 
territorial divisions were broadly retained. When he was reminded about his earlier 
commitment to reorganisation, Nehru admitted that he was 'never very enthusiastic 
about linguistic provinces' (quoted in Das Gupta, 1988:148).  
Nehru was concerned that the division of India into linguistic States would encourage 
the development of 'sub-nationalities', which might in turn come to demand their own 
separate sovereign states (King, 1997). The 1948 Linguistic Provinces Commission of 
the Constituent Assembly (the Dar Commission) affirmed this view, and warned of the 
dangers to Indian unity posed by the creation of linguistic provinces (Government of 
India, 1949; Brass, 1966). Moore (1982) suggests that the confusion, changes and 
political battles that preceded the hasty British departure from India all contributed to 
a climate of uncertainty and concern about its potential disintegration. Four events, 
circumstances and historical conditions contributed to this concern, and were 
profoundly significant in shaping both the territorial map of States and the highly 
centralised Constitution: 
i) The bloody events and communal nightmare that accompanied Partition. Hundreds 
of thousands died and millions were displaced, deeply traumatising the infant nation-
state(s). The fear/threat of further dismemberment became highly formative in 
determining the Indian national leadership's early responses to questions of regional 
autonomy (Banerjee, 1989). 
ii) The challenge of integrating the Princely States. As late as May 1947 Nehru 
protested to Mountbatten that British plans to let the Crown's paramountcy over the 
Princely States lapse with Independence (rather than transferring paramountcy to the 
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 new sovereign authority), would result in the 'balkanisation' of India (Mukarji, 1995). A 
bargain was eventually struck whereby India accepted Dominion status in return for 
British assistance in bringing the Princely States to heel. Jalal (1995) suggests that 
the horrors of Partition sobered and quieted the 'potentially more explosive' issue of 
provincial autonomy, and the Princely States were integrated into the Indian Union 
within the remarkably short space of time of two years (Verma, 1994). Rulers were 
told that they had only to delegate defence, foreign affairs and communications to the 
Centre, but once they acceded the Centre gradually assumed more extensive powers 
(see Menon, 1956).  
iii) The modernising and nation-building aspirations of many in the Indian National 
Congress, later the Congress Party. Nehru, exemplified this outlook, believing 
profoundly in the overarching cultural and societal unity of India, and the vision of 
India's destiny as a modern sovereign nation-state (Nehru, 1946; Mookerjee, 1954). 
The struggle for Independence was seen by Nehru and many other nationalists as a 
critical period of 'nation-in-the-making' through the forging of a modern national 
consciousness, and they were concerned that the reactionary forces of ethnicity, 
language, religion and regional culture would hinder this process, or even prevail.  
iv) The sheer cultural, linguistic, ethnic, geographical and religious diversity of India, 
which encouraged anxieties that this "mere geographical expression" (Seeley, 
1883:92), might disintegrate. Despite Nehru's convictions about the unity of India, he 
was painfully aware that it had never before been united under one political authority. 
It should be noted that Article 3 of the Constitution did make provision for a future 
States reorganisation, and one commentator has suggested that the initial lack of 
change was the result of other more pressing commitments for the new Government 
than any intransigence on Nehru's part (Vanhanen, 1992:70). King (1997) also offers 
a positive reading of the way in which Nehru handled the issue of territorial 
reorganisation issue during the first critical years of independence. Nevertheless, the 
map of India that emerged in 1947 was a clumsy division of Class 'A' States, which 
were made up of the former British Provinces, such as Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal 
and Bihar; Class 'B' States, which were made up of former large Princely States and 
large amalgamated Unions of States, such as Hyderabad, Mysore and Rajasthan; 
and Class 'C' States, which were those formed out of smaller Princely States, such as 
Bhopal, Delhi and Vindhya Pradesh. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands did not come 
under this system, and were administered directly from the Centre (Menon, 1956). As 
Sukhwal (1985) notes, '[T]he boundaries formed after the integration of princely states 
and former British provinces were economically, administratively, linguistically and 
culturally illogical' (quoted in Vanhanen, 1992:70). 
By the early 1950s, it was clear that State politicians, regional elites and, in some 
cases, ordinary people wanted change, and specifically the creation of States which 
would reflect linguistic and cultural patterns and differences. The Centre was finally 
forced to concede in 1953 following protests and riots in Madras, and the fast to 
death of a prominent Gandhian leader (Spear, 1965). Madras was divided between 
Andhra Pradesh for Telugu speakers, and Tamil Nadu for Tamil speakers (in both 
States there remained, of course, other minority languages). It was clear that the 
issue of State boundaries required a more comprehensive policy study, and in the 
same year the Government set up a States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) to 
look into the matter of territorial reorganisation. The four principles guiding the 
Commissioners were (a) the preservation and strengthening of the unity and security 
of India, (b) linguistic and cultural homogeneity, (c) financial, economic and 
administrative considerations, and (d) the successful working of the Five Year Plans 
(Narain, 1977). 
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 The States Reorganisation Report that followed two years later proposed that India's 
unity would be enhanced, not compromised, by the greater recognition and 
protection of its regional languages and cultures (Government of India, 1955:45). 
Many of its recommendations were implemented in 1956 States Reorganisation Act, 
leading to the redrawing of territorial boundaries to form more linguistically 
homogenous States, particularly in the South. Although language was the main 
criterion, other factors played a tacit part in these decisions, including regional 
culture, economic viability and religion (Khan, 1977). But even as Nehru partially 
conceded the formation of linguistic States, he tried to mitigate the effects they might 
have on fanning sub-national sentiments by setting up five Zonal Councils (North, 
South, East, West and Central).4 These Councils, each of which included several 
States, were expected to act "as a corrective to the over-emphasis upon sectional 
and linguistic loyalties, [and were] an effort to establish values transcending 
language and religion" (Bondurant, 1958:146). However, they were only given 
advisory roles, and failed to develop into significant political institutions (Thakur, 
1995).  
The 1956 reorganisation reduced the number of States in India from twenty-seven to 
fourteen (plus six centrally-administered territories), many of which were 
geographically huge and extremely heterogeneous.5 Some thought that the size and 
diversity of these States would prove inimical to their development. KM Pannikar, for 
example, one of the three States' Reorganisation Commissioners, included a note of 
dissent on Uttar Pradesh (UP) in an appendix to the 1955 Report. He argued that UP 
should be divided as its sheer size would hinder administrative efficiency and 
development. He was also concerned that this enormous State, with by far the 
largest number of representatives in the national parliament, would exert an undue 
influence on central politics (Government of India, 1955). Pannikar was opposed by 
Nehru and other senior politicians in Delhi and in UP itself, who for various reasons 
wanted the State to remain undivided, and who claimed to place their faith in the 
efficacy of planning. Development planners were expected to be able to take the 
geographical, cultural and remaining linguistic diversity of the large States into 
consideration and deal with it. It was also a period of optimism (amongst the elite 
anyway) with regard to the notion of political rationality and neutrality (see Kaviraj, 
1991). Although corruption, nepotism and overt caste and regional loyalties were 
present, they were not as entrenched or endemic as in later years.  
But while Nehru may have hoped that these changes had satisfied the demand for 
territorial reordering, struggles continued in and across a number of States. In 1960, 
the bilingual Province of Bombay was divided into the States of Maharashtra and 
Gujarat after violent language riots. Demands for a Punjab State were also resisted 
at first because they were perceived as being religiously (Sikh) motivated. Brass 
(1994) suggests that only after a leader was elected in whom Delhi leaders could 
place their trust was a State of Punjab conceded, ostensibly on linguistic grounds. 
Accordingly, in 1966 'greater Punjab' was split between Punjab, Haryana and 
Himachal Pradesh (although the latter did not receive full State recognition until 
1971). Oommen (1990b) has argued that in substance this amounted to the 
acceptance of religion as a valid basis for State formation. Several new States have 
since been created in the North-East of India, and it would appear that ethnicity also 
has been granted recognition as an 'informally valid' basis for political-administrative 
reorganisation under certain circumstances. Meghalaya was accorded Statehood in 
1971, Manipur and Tripura in 1972, and Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram became 
States in 1986. Oommen (1990b) suggests that their 'geopolitical resource' of being 
border areas helped them achieve Statehood, although the years of fierce 
insurgency probably contributed to their success (Mukarji, 1995). Goa upgraded from 
Union Territory status to a State in 1985, and Delhi in 1998.6  
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 In the last two years there has been another wave of State creation, in the shape of 
Uttaranchal,7 Jharkhand8 and Chhattisgarh9. Each of the three areas is economically 
'backward' (in official and popular jargon), and each shared a sense of injustice about 
their regional exploitation by the States of which they were previously a part (Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh respectively). All three areas are also, to a 
degree, ethno-culturally marginal: Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh because of their 
relatively large adivasi (tribal) populations, and Uttaranchal because of its pahari 
(mountain) geography and identity. But there are also considerable differences 
between the three regions, particularly in terms of the histories of their regional 
identities; the many divisions and differences within each region; the vocabularies 
and strategies of protest they have employed; and their relationships with the 
different political parties, respective State Governments and the Centre. Thus, it must 
be emphasised that each of the regions and demands are unique, and each requires 
careful individual study. Nevertheless, despite their differences, these respective 
regional mobilisations can also be analysed within a broader set of changes within 
India's political economy, which are the subject of this paper.  
 
THEORISING THE RECENT TERRITORIAL REORGANISATION IN INDIA 
How has the Central Government’s decision to create these new States been 
received in India? One response is that it represents a lurch towards the 
balkanisation of the country, as it will open a Pandora's Box of regional demands 
which may ultimately result in the disintegration of India. Nehru feared this possibility, 
and it formed the centre of Selig Harrison's dire warning that the linguistic States 
represented a dangerous encouragement to secessionist forces (Harrison, 1960, 
1963; see also De, 1966; Dikshit, 1975). The global surge of ethno-nationalist conflict 
in the 1980s and 1990s and the tragic example of Yugoslavia have served to rekindle 
these fears (Deccan Herald, 2 April 1998). An (un-named) 'former Chief Minister of 
Bihar', for example, was quoted as saying, 'Divisions of Bihar will jeopardise national 
and regional interests and affect national unity and integrity besides encouraging 
separatist and extremist forces' (Times of India, 16 September 1998). 
However, although a subject of debate, and a concern for many, this view is less 
influential than in previous years, and there are a number of reasons to reject the 
prognosis of India's disintegration. First, to take the example of the three new States, 
although the struggle in Jharkhand was often violent, and the demand for Statehood 
in Uttaranchal was intense, the decision to make the Chhattisgarh region into a State 
was certainly not the act of a reluctant Government succumbing to overwhelming 
popular protest and pressure. Indeed, a popular movement for a Chhattisgarh States 
seems to have been extremely muted, and the Central Government (BJP-led at the 
time) obviously did not envisage the creation of this or the other two States as 
representing a threat to India's unity. The experience of fifty years of Independence 
as a sovereign 'nation-state', during which crises in Punjab, Kashmir and the North 
East have been weathered (if not always best or finally resolved), has perhaps 
engendered more security and confidence in India's continued unity amongst many 
policy makers.  
Second, none of the regional movements in Uttaranchal, Jharkhand or Chhattisgarh 
displayed any serious separatist intent, and with the exception of certain struggles in 
the North East (such as Bodoland, which has a moderate group seeking Statehood 
and a more extreme group demanding secession), neither do most of the other 
contemporary regional movements in India. In the future, of course, all or part of a 
particular movement could come to embrace secessionist demands, but this seems 
unlikely. These mobilisations have been for the most part directed against their 
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 respective State Governments, which were/are usually identified as the primary site 
of neglect, oppression and/or internal colonialism, rather than the Central 
Government. As Brass (1994) notes, regional groups are pushing for greater access 
to political power and control over the Government purse, not cultural or linguistic 
separation (see also Narain, 1977). This is not to say that the movements for greater 
territorial autonomy in other regions will not be encouraged. Following the 1998 
announcement, for example, there have been demands for a State of Kodagu, 
currently a part of Karnataka, (Deccan Herald, 31 August 1997), and from various 
ethnic groups in the North East (Deccan Herald, 2 April 1998). Two new political 
parties in Andhra Pradesh, both established in 1997, have made Statehood for the 
Telengana region their main electoral plank (Deccan Herald, 16 December 1997), 
while there have been increased stirrings of regional demands in Bundelkhand, 
Vidharba, eastern and western Uttar Pradesh, the Vindhya region and elsewhere. 
But although they will require careful handling, these regional demands need not 
necessarily be pernicious to the unity of India - a claim which leads us on to the 
second major theory concerning territorial reorganisation. 
A number of commentators have argued that the Indian polity is not sufficiently 
decentralised given the plural nature of India’s society, culture and political past, and 
it could be suggested that the creation of smaller States would be ones means of 
achieving this. Paul Brass (1982) has famously argued that the centralising drives of 
the state have in fact worsened regional and other societal tensions, rather than 
contained or managed them. He suggests that the centralisation of power, decision-
making and control of resources in one of the world’s most culturally diverse and 
socially fragmented countries has had unintended results. These include the erosion 
of the effectiveness of some political organisations; the declining ability of the Central 
Government to implement development Plans in the States and localities; and the 
heightening of ethnic, religious, caste and other regional and cultural conflicts. In a 
new era of liberalisation, these pressures have only increased. States are now 
permitted to engage directly with external donor and corporate interests (from the 
World Bank to multi-national corporations), and there is growing evidence of the 
regionally uneven impact that such policies are having, within States as well as 
between them (Kennedy, 2000; Bajpai and Sachs, 1999; Ahluwalia, 2000; Corbridge 
and Harriss, 2000; Nagaraj, 2000). States now have far more agency in negotiating 
their economic futures, and some are avidly pursuing a global identity and position. 
Liberalisation has opened up new political avenues of wealth creation, particularly for 
certain regions and sectional interests (Jenkins, 1999) 
The 'over-centralisation thesis' has led many commentators to suggest that 
administrative, territorial and political decentralisation would strengthen the nation-
state of India, not, as many at the Centre fear, weaken it (Kothari, 1989). The 
debates on how to achieve this have focussed on strengthening and supporting local 
democratic institutions (notably the village panchayats and municipal councils), 
Constitutional reform (such as devolving more power to the States) and encouraging 
greater political and bureaucratic transparency and accountability. But some 
commentators, notably Rasheeduddin Khan, have added to this another possibility: 
the major reorganisation of India's constituent units in order to encourage a more 
genuinely plural, decentralised and democratic nation-state (Khan, 1977, 1992). In 
his 'manifesto for change from the present centralised, dysfunctional, anachronistic 
union system' to an 'equipoised, co-operative and contemporary federalism', Khan 
argues that India needs to return to 'socio-cultural ecology' as the basis for political-
administrative organisation. Territorial reorganisation is one of the measures required 
in order to transform the large, administratively unwieldy, politically troublesome and 
economically uneven States into a more 'rational' map of States based upon 
economic viability, socio-cultural homogeneity and political and administrative 
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 manageability. Khan actually proposes that India be made up of over 50 States. A 
number of other senior political commentators are sympathetic to this broad 
argument (if not, perhaps, to Khan’s suggestion). Rajni Kothari, for example, 
suggests that: 
A large part of such assertions [of ethnic identities demanding more 
autonomous spaces for themselves] need to be considered as natural 
concomitants of the democratic struggle for achieving a more participant and 
decentralised polity and economy (Kothari, 1989:13). 
Kothari believes that analyses of India’s federal structure and processes have for too 
long been dominated by accounts of the workings of the Union and its constituent 
units. He strongly suggests that we must go beyond these Centre-State debates, 
which can present a sterile and overly 'mechanistic' view of federalism, and move 
towards an analysis of the more fundamental dialectic between the state and society. 
This is supported by a more 'organic' view of federalism which would argue that 
Indian society is itself federal, and locates the weakness of the system in the poor 
politicising of that federalism. From this perspective, the regional movements of post-
colonial India can be seen as one expression of the increasing political engagement 
of different, and often marginal, social groups, who are demanding a more 
participatory and decentralised polity. Both Rasheeduddin Khan and Rajni Kothari 
recognise, as Graham Smith argues, that 'there is no basis in political theory for 
claiming that smaller territorial units are necessarily more hospitable to democratic 
politics' (Smith, 1996:398). Neither are smaller territorial units necessarily going to be 
more administratively efficient or 'developmentally' effective. But there is much that is 
positive and plausible in the arguments for smaller States, both for the specific 
regions under review, and even, arguably, as an agenda for a second States 
reorganisation. Many of the current States of India are administrative leviathans, and 
the sheer physical distance ordinary people, politicians and government officials have 
to cover can act to alienate groups and regions, and hinder sensitive or well-managed 
development planning and initiatives. Smaller States may well provide a more 
propitious environment for more manageable administrative loads; greater 
understanding of and commitment to the local region; and more proximity between 
people and political and institutional centres of power. 
However, there are a number of problems with this agenda for a more 'rationally' 
organised map of India. First, under present administrative and government 
structures, the new States would require an expensive multiplication of capitals, 
Assemblies (State parliaments), Ministries, Courts and other accoutrements of 
government. The ideal scenario would envisage that the reorganised States would 
facilitate enhanced economic growth through more effective and efficient 
development measures - an expectation that is by no means assured. Second, in 
terms of democratic functioning, these regional mobilisations, like other social 
movements, can mask partial and elite interests and manipulations, even, or 
especially, in marginal areas. Again there can be no automatic assumption that a new 
State would lead to greater social or political justice. A third problem concerns the 
impact that the creation of smaller, more culturally and linguistically homogenous 
States might have on fanning regional or ethnic chauvinism. India has a long history 
of 'sons of the soil' movements, which although diverse in form and nature, usually 
aim at the exclusion of 'outsiders' from the State/region through expulsion, or 
privileging the ‘native’ population through the setting up of a system of preferential 
politics to guarantee their 'rights' to employment, land and political power (Weiner, 
1978; Das Gupta, 1988). None of these problems are inevitable or inexorable, and 
the various outcomes of territorial reorganisation would be highly place specific and 
context-dependent. However, these general concerns suggest caution must be 
exercised. 
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 The BJP-led Government which oversaw the creation of the latest three States 
offered the public little detail on its reasons for their decision beyond rather vague 
references to administrative efficiency and improved democratic transparency and 
responsibility. In March 1998, for example, the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, 
was quoted as being, 'of the view that the formation of these three States was 
necessary for the proper development of these areas' (Deccan Herald, 31 March 
1998). L.K. Advani, the Home Minister, stated that in general he favoured smaller 
States in the interests of growth and development: 'The rationale behind this decision 
was the administrative problems created because of the very large size of the States 
of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh' (Times of India, 11 June 1998). But 
despite the political rhetoric, the evidence suggests that most parties are not 
motivated primarily by the developmental and democratic merits (or demerits, in the 
case of opponents) of greater federal decentralisation, but by considerations of short 
term political expediency. In some cases, the electoral benefits that might accrue to 
the parties over this issue seem to have outweighed any consideration of the 
financial, social or political viability of the States. With regard to Chhattisgarh, for 
example, it has been suggested that: 
Nothing except electoral arithmetic seems to have prompted the entire 
spectrum of political parties relevant to Madhya Pradesh to support the 
formation of a separate Chhattisgarh State ... privately the leaders of almost 
all parties admit that the move is devoid of any logic and could prove 
detrimental to both the States  (Deccan Herald, 10 September 1998).  
In the next section this relationship between political opportunism and the creation of 
new States is taken up in detail, and is situated within broader changes in the Indian 
political landscape. 
 
THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDIA 
In the mid-1960s there was something of a 'sea change' in India's political economy, 
marking a shift from what Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) have termed ‘command’ to 
‘demand politics’. One of the best studies of this widely identified transition is Atul 
Kohli's (1990) exploration of India's 'growing crisis of governability'. Kohli refers to the 
increasing 'strain' that has emerged in the Indian polity since the mid-1960s, 
demonstrated in the absence of enduring coalitions, a growing political 
ineffectiveness in dealing with important problems, and an inability to accommodate 
growing political conflict (including regional demands) without resorting to force and 
violence. These are argued to be the products of uncontrolled politicisation within 
both the state and civil society, which has resulted in the incapacity of the state to 
"simultaneously promote development and to accommodate diverse interests" (Kohli, 
1990:14). 
Kohli contends that the roots of India’s governability problem are political rather than 
socio-economic, with a highly interventionist state attempting to deal with a poor 
economy and in the process becoming the object of intense political competition. He 
traces the success and hegemony of the Congress Party prior to the mid-1960s to its 
strong party organisation (especially at the District level), its adaptive qualities, and 
the positive role that access to patronage resources played in building electoral 
support (often organised through 'traditional' vote banks). Congress also benefited 
from the charismatic leadership of Nehru, from the prestige and legitimacy it had won 
during the independence struggle, from a lack of any effective opposition, and from a 
favourable international economy that aided steady economic growth. But by the early 
1970s major changes were clearly under way, signalled by the decline of India's 
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 institutions, and especially the Congress Party. Kohli associates this with Indira 
Gandhi's decision to rule and maintain power through populism - a strategy that, he 
suggests, was inherently destabilising. Power became more and more concentrated 
in the person of Mrs. Gandhi and in the primacy of New Delhi over the States, for 
example through the initiation of the procedure of direct appointment from above 
rather than by election from below, and the constant intervention in State politics.  
Although Kohli uses this familiar 'Nehru good/Indira bad' format in analysing changes 
in the Indian polity, he avoids, as Corbridge (1995) notes, the temptation to stylise the 
different periods too personally. Nehru could afford to keep a lighter hand on the reins 
during the period of Congress hegemony, but by the time Mrs. Gandhi came to 
power, serious opposition had arisen at both the State and national level, and Kohli 
draws out some of the events and processes of the 1960s and 1970s that prompted 
Mrs. Gandhi's 'strategy' of personalised rule.10 The Indo-Chinese war in 1962 saw the 
Chinese cross the Indo-Tibet border with impunity, badly shaking India's confidence in 
itself and in its Armed Forces. Nehru's death in 1964, calamitous monsoon failures 
between 1965 and 1967, and the suspension of planning from 1966 to 1969 added to 
the erosion of early post-Independence optimism. The latter was part of a wider crisis 
in the Indian economy during Indira Gandhi's premiership, as it fell prey to some of 
the contradictions of a capital goods-based import substitution strategy. Suffocated by 
the mammoth bureaucracy that the complex planning and licensing system had 
engendered, the economy slowed down (Ahluwalia, 1985; Bhagwati, 1993; Lewis, 
1995).11 The growing power of the dominant proprietary classes vis-à-vis the Central 
Government further impaired the economy's ability to function efficiently, as savings 
vital to sustain capital investment in industry were withheld (Bardhan, 1984). 
Meanwhile the international economy was also tightening following the 1973/4 and 
1978/9 oil crises, compounding internal difficulties. 
Given this situation, Congress was increasingly forced to 'buy' votes with the adoption 
of social programmes for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and through various loans, 
concessions and benefits for other social groups such as farmers and students. The 
costs of these programmes could only be met by deficit financing, contributing to the 
growing fiscal crisis of the 1980s. This further politicised the regional policies of New 
Delhi and of the State Governments, as different regions and social groups competed 
for scarce resources. Mrs. Gandhi tried to maintain her authority by destabilising 
hostile State governments and through an even more concentrated personalisation of 
rule ('India is Indira and Indira is India' was a celebrated slogan, coined in 1976 by the 
then Congress President, Dev Kanta Barooah). In an atmosphere of growing 
paranoia, many Congress candidates were selected on the basis of their personal 
loyalty, not their aptitude, political experience or skill, and Indira Gandhi increasingly 
fell back on direct, populist campaigns, by-passing the (by now) largely defunct 
Congress organisation. 
Kohli points to the continuing institutional decline that marks Congress and the wider 
Indian polity, and the growing mobilisation of various social and economic groups, 
including the intense regional and ethnic activism of the 1980s and 1990s. Closely 
related to this is one of the most important political trends of the last twenty years - 
the growth in the number and success of various regional parties taking power in 
individual States (or two or three at most) all over India (Datta, 1994). These parties 
do not, or cannot, realistically aspire to national power, but they have come to exert 
an increasingly powerful role in the national polity in their position as allies of the 
larger parties (Saez, 2002).  
However, for some time in the early 1990s, it looked as if the Bharatiya Janata Party 
might break this trend. As the party political expression of the Hindu Right, the BJP 
experienced a phenomenal rise in support over the 1980s and 1990s, and it has 
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 emerged as the biggest single-party opponent to Congress and the other smaller 
'secular' left wing parties (Jaffrelot, 1993; Hansen, 1999). Compared to the other 
major parties it has a well-established internal structure through its hierarchy of local, 
State and national organisations, and unlike many of its political opponents, the BJP 
appears to articulate a powerful and coherent vision of and for India, centring on the 
notion of 'Hindutva' - a Hindu nation-state. The unity of the Hindu body politic, and its 
masculine aggressiveness, have been signalled, for example, in the highly symbolic 
yatras or processions around India, and in the testing of the nuclear bombs in 
Pokhran in 1998 (Van der Veer, 1994; Corbridge, 1999).  
But a number of factors have worked against the BJP's particular vision of national 
unity, and may well be decisive in preventing the party from achieving undisputed 
political and ideological hegemony. These include the deep roots of secularism, and 
the left-wing and low caste backlash that the BJP's rise to power has provoked 
(Hassan, 1998; Lerche, 1998). The emergence and strengthening of lower and 
Backward caste parties (especially in the north) over the 1990s, and the well-
recorded rise of regional parties all over India have increased political competition for 
the BJP, while although much depleted and weakened, the Congress Party is not yet 
spent, and at this time still forms the second largest single party in Parliament. 
Another problem for the BJP is the cultural and religious diversity within India. The 
Hindu vision espoused by the BJP and its non-political associates does not just 
alienate many amongst the non-Hindu population (such as Christians, Jains, Sikhs, 
Muslims, animists and Buddhists, and arguably the Scheduled Castes, or former 
Untouchables), but even amongst Hindus it is more often more regionally than 
nationally salient or attractive (Manor, 1998; Chiriyankandath, 1998; Corbridge, 
1999). For these reasons, amongst others, although the BJP's 1998 election 
campaign was marked by considerably more moderation than in 1991 and 1996, the 
party still only won 179 Parliamentary seats out of a total of 543. Because of these 
electoral weaknesses, by 1999 the BJP remained in the uncomfortable and unstable 
position of heading up a weak coalition government in alliance with a number of 
fractious and sometimes dangerously disruptive regional parties (notably the 
AIADMK in Tamil Nadu under Jayalalitha). In the elections of September-October 
1999 the BJP won more seats, but they remained vulnerable to pressure from 
coalition partners, and overall the leverage of regional parties in national government 
is evident. 
This has resulted in a situation in which few seats either way can determine who 
rules in some of the States, and given the delicate balance in the Centre, may even 
be influential in winning or losing Government. The fierce political competition that 
this has engendered has, amongst other things, encouraged political parties to court 
a number of populist lines in different States. This is particularly true of the BJP, as it 
has sought to replace the waning support generated by the Ayodhya temple-mosque 
controversy (Hansen, 1999) with other issues, often pitched at the regional or State 
scale. Regional movements may offer particularly attractive mobilisations to support, 
given the clear potential political pay-offs (in terms of MPs and State Governments) 
that would result from the creation of a new federal unit. For example, in the 1998 
general elections the BJP won 11 of the 14 Lok Sabha (national parliament) seats in 
the Jharkhand region; in Uttaranchal they won 4 out of 4 seats; and in Chhattisgarh 
they won 7 out of 11 seats. Amongst other calculations of regional interest12, creating 
these areas as States would strengthen the BJP's hand against opposition parties in 
Parliament, as well as bolster its position in relation to its demanding and 
dangerously powerful political allies. It would, in theory, deliver them more State 
governments, and possibly more MPs, as there are plans to increase representation 
in some the areas. However, continued support for the BJP in these regions was, of 
course, by no means assured, and it was the potential for other parties to 'poach' the 
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 issue that appeared to drive their support for the new States and compete with the 
BJP over this issue. By the same token, the uncertainty as to who would reap the 
political reward for the new States is one reason why the BJP Government spent 
some time prevaricating on translating their promise into action. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The demand for new States has once again emerged as a major issue in India. In 
certain areas, often, although not always, characterised by economic and/or social 
marginalisation, and possessing a sense of geographical, ethnic, cultural and/or 
linguistic regional identity,13 the struggle for a political voice and access to the state 
has been channelled into the desire for a separate State within the Union of India. 
These trends can be set within the politicisation of society observed by Atul Kohli and 
many others, and the related growth of social movements over the last twenty years 
or so. These 'changes from below' are, of course, reflexively bound up with 'changes 
from above' and the broader trends within India's political economy in relation to 
internal border changes have been the focus of this paper. This macro-political 
context is a key 'field of opportunity' within which these non-secessionist regional 
movements articulate and must be understood. The analysis presented here helps 
explain why a number of these demands (some of which go back decades) finally 
appear to be experiencing success. In a polity in which the Central Government has 
absolute Constitutional power over changes to federal boundaries (even if, 
theoretically, the State Legislatures do not approve the changes), the shift in political 
attitudes in New Delhi is critical. 
The differences between Nehru and Indira Gandhi's regimes in relation to regional 
demands have been persuasively analysed by Paul Brass (1994). He argues that 
whereas Nehru generally sought to distance the Central Government from the 
regional struggles in various States, and arbitrate only in the last instance, Indira 
Gandhi chose to meddle dangerously and sometimes subversively in regional and 
other issues. This, Brass suggests, resulted in escalating levels of bitterness and 
violence, and paradoxically, given Indira Gandhi's centralising desires, was 
associated with the increasing ineffectiveness of the Central Government in 
managing conflicts. As more regional parties began to erode Congress dominance in 
the States (and then at the Centre), Indira Gandhi's Government increasingly lost the 
ability, as well as the desire, to act as neutrally and 'above' State politics. Although 
we must be careful not to draw too stark a divide between the rules of father and 
daughter, a decisive feature of the last thirty years of Indian politics has been the 
entry of the Central Government into the hurly burly of State politics, and often in a 
poor position to negotiate or manage the situation.  
This paper has picked up the story from the late-1980s onwards, and suggests that 
continuing changes in India's political economy have resulted in a new relationship 
between the Centre and those regions demanding greater political autonomy. This 
paper has argued that liberalisation, the rise of the Hindu Right, the declining ability 
of any one party to win power at the Centre, and the concomitant rise of coalition 
politics, have all contributed to a qualitatively different political terrain in India in the 
1990s and new millennium. In contrast to the relative stability of previous decades, 
the 1990s have witnessed a rapid 'turnover' of Central Governments, with four 
general elections between 1996 and 1999 alone (in the forty-four years prior to 1991, 
there had only been ten general elections). In these circumstances, different political 
parties have become significantly more receptive to the idea of (limited) territorial 
given the votes that this might win them. Political opportunism is hardly new in India, 
in relation to the creation of new States as much as anything else, and as Brass's 
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 analysis above suggests, it would be foolish to suggest that short-term strategic 
decision making on this subject is an entirely novel situation. What is perhaps 
different is the degree and depth to which various national actors have been drawn 
in, such as the central bodies of the Congress Party, the Janata Party and the BJP 
(not just their State units), when in opposition and when in Government, as well as 
various smaller but still influential parties. In the last few years, successive Central 
Governments have adopted a different attitude to a number of regional demands, 
which, although couched in the positive (and welcome) rhetoric of greater 
decentralisation, may simply represent the narrow electioneering that has often 
characterised local and regional party political responses to this issue. The Centre is 
by no means toothless, and will no doubt continue to resist those non-secessionist 
regional movements that it deems inappropriate or divisive. However, at present, 
territorial reorganisation is very much back on the political agenda for India, 
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1My concern here is with ‘national’ parties (such as Congress, the BJP and the Janata Party, 
which have an enduring national presence), as well as influential smaller parties (present in 
one-three States, but which have played a significant role in recent federal politics through a 
sufficient presence in the national parliament. Examples would include the AAIADMK, the SP 
and the Akali Dal).  
2See, for example, Mawdsley (1996) on this inconsistency in relation to Uttaranchal. 
3This represents a future research agenda. During the regional struggle in Uttaranchal, for 
example, many men and women spoke not just of a new State but a different State 
(Mawdsley, 1999). While it is more than likely that old patterns of governance will continue, 
the projections of what a ‘good’ State would be is highly suggestive. There is much to explore 
here in relation to grassroots and elite debates about developmental and democratic 
functioning and ideologies, especially at this time of change, and intensity of 
expectation/disappointment.  
4A North Eastern Zonal Council followed in 1972. 
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5This remained true, inevitably, even on linguistic grounds. It has been estimated that India 
has over 3000 languages and dialects, of which at least 33 languages have over a million 
speakers.   
6Union Territories are smaller areas and cities which, usually for historical reasons, are 
directly adminstered by the Centre in a number of key respects. Examples include the city of 
Chandigarh (on the border of Punjab and Haryana), Pondicherry and the Lakshadweep 
Islands. 
7For more details on Uttaranchal (also known as Uttarakhand), see Aryal (1994), Dhoundiyal 
et al (1993), Valdiya (1996), Mehta (1996), Mawdsley  (1997) and Kumar (2000). 
8Jharkhand is made up of what had been southern Bihar. For more details, see Corbridge 
(1987, 1988, 1991) and Munda (1990). 
9Chhattisgarh forms a large part of ‘tribal’ eastern Madhya Pradesh. Relatively little has been 
written about the regional movement or issue of Statehood here, but see Shukla (1999). 
10Kohli (1990) points out that Indira Gandhi cannot be held responsible for the low party 
organisation of other political parties or, in some cases, their move towards populism as an 
electoral strategy. ‘NTR’ (N.T. Rama Rao) and M.G.R. Ramachandran, for example, 
encouraged personality cults and other populist political strategies in the Telugu Desam Party 
(Andhra Pradesh) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazgham (Tamil Nadu) 
respectively. Jalal (1995) argues that in any case Nehru's rule was more centralising than is 
commonly portrayed. For example, he was not averse to dismissing troublesome State 
governments (Congress included), such as the Communist Government of Kerala in 1959. 
11For a more sympathetic account of planning and India’s economic performance, see 
Chakrabarty (1987). 
12For example, dividing Bihar was an attractive prospect to the BJP, as it would seriously 
undermine the power and political empire of Laloo Prasad Yadav, the tenacious de jure or de 
facto Chief Minister of the State. 
13This paper does not address the thorny question of how regions may be defined in the 
Indian (or any other) context, but see contributors to Crane (1966) and Fox (1977), as well as 
Maheshwari, (1977) and Schwartzberg (1992). 
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